by SABINE VOLK
Six years after its emergence in the eastern German state of Saxony, the far-right populist movement ‘Pegida’ still polarises German politics and society. Sabine Volk argues that the movement’s continued popularity highlights the stark divisions that persist within Germany.
In October, the Dresden-based far-right populist group “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident” (Pegida) celebrated yet another anniversary. For six years now, the protest movement has been known for its regular street demonstrations against immigration and Islam, the German government and political establishment, as well as the liberal press and public.
Pegida has contributed to Dresden’s image as a city with a ‘Nazi problem’, as well as to the increasing polarisation of German society, three decades after the country’s reunification. Recent ethnographic research I have conducted on far-right politics in eastern Germany demonstrates this polarisation on the streets of Dresden – a city which since 1989 had been positively associated with Germany’s “only successful revolution from below”.
Far-right protest and counter-protest
This year, Pegida celebrated its anniversary not as planned with the usual large-scale rally on one of the most picturesque squares in Dresden’s historical centre, but with a so-called action week set up at the very last moment. Over a period of five days, Pegida organised small-scale gatherings in Dresden and its surroundings, as well as in the city of Cottbus in the eastern German state of Brandenburg.
Whereas the first event followed the procedures institutionalised throughout the past six years, the following three included novel ‘open mic’ sessions in which the public could voice their concerns about German politics. The final event in Cottbus gathered some of the most prominent politicians of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), including Alexander Gauland, the party’s honorary chairman, and Björn Höcke, parliamentary leader in the state of Thuringia and former leader of the party’s extremist faction ‘The Wing’.
All five rallies were disturbed by noisy left-wing counter-protesters. The largest and broadest counter-mobilisations, however, took place on Sunday, 25 October, the date of Pegida’s initially planned anniversary. That Sunday, it was possible to publicly express one’s opposition to Pegida in at least six events spread out across Dresden, including rallies, bike rallies, and concerts – though none took place next to Pegida’s events. Remarkably, these were not only the usual leftist events gathering mostly young, alternative people with their drums and whistles, but also included participation from members of conservative parties, namely the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Liberal Democrats (FDP), who mobilised for a ‘civilian protest’ against the far right – the second time they have done so.
Covid-19 disrupts Pegida’s protest ritual
Pegida had called off its original large-scale rally on Dresden’s Neumarkt at the very last moment. According to chairman Lutz Bachmann, the cancellation was due to the national lockdowns associated with Covid-19, which limited the possibilities for international travel. Specifically, the invited guests from outside Germany, including influential far-right activists Martin Sellner from Austria and Tommy Robinson from England, were not able to travel to Dresden. Sellner had been one of the most celebrated speakers last year.
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