by ESKANDER SADEGHI-BOROUJERDI
The recent wave of protests in Iran have generated an extraordinary volume of commentary, much of it framed through familiar but misleading scripts. Some cast the unrest as an imminent revolutionary rupture; others as exclusively the product of foreign destabilization; still others as the delayed reckoning of a society finally pushed beyond endurance. Each captures part of the picture, but none adequately explains the dynamics of the present conjuncture. What is unfolding is better understood as the convergence of accumulated social exhaustion, acute distributive shock and a crisis of governance which the Islamic Republic no longer possesses the ideological, bureaucratic or fiscal resources to manage.
The protests have been sustained by a form of negative solidarity: a cross-cutting social coalition that stretches from elements of the rural poor and borderlands to the downwardly mobile middle classes and urban precariat of Tehran and other major cities. What unites them is not so much a shared project as repudiation of the Islamic Republic, and with it decades of failed efforts at structural reform and transformation. Beyond this refusal, however, the contours of a viable alternative remain indeterminate.
The immediate trigger for the protests was fiscal. Budgetary measures advanced under President Masoud Pezeshkian, particularly those affecting exchange rates and import licensing, sharpened pressures within an already distorted currency regime. The impact was felt most immediately among electronics vendors in Tehran’s bazaars, whose livelihoods depend on access to foreign currency and predictable pricing. The new rules soon translated into higher costs, disrupted supply chains and material losses. What transformed this sectoral grievance into a political rupture was the wider economic context. Years of inflation exceeding 40 per cent, with food inflation surpassing 70 per cent, infrastructural decay, water mismanagement, electricity shortages and toxic air pollution had already pushed large sections of Iran’s working and lower-middle classes into chronic insecurity. Since the Twelve-Day War in June the rial has depreciated by roughly 40 percent, and government employees’ wages have fallen by more than 20 per cent in real terms. Long-term socio-economic deterioration has converged with more immediate episodes of fiscal mismanagement. The budget did not create these conditions, but it crystallized a perception that the state protects rent seekers while offloading adjustment costs onto those least able to absorb them. The government’s pledges to provide food vouchers have done little to placate public fury. For decades, the Islamic Republic has pursued a form of authoritarian neoliberalism that has deregulated and precariatized labour while transferring state assets to parastatal organisations – from so-called revolutionary foundations and pension funds to subsidiaries of the Revolutionary Guards – coupled with the imposition of austerity from above. This provided a recipe for mass discontent and recurrent revolt.
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