Bangladesh’s protests explained: What led to PM’s ouster and the challenges that lie ahead

by TAZREENA SAJJAD

MAP/Mapsland

Bangladesh’s embattled prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, fled the country on Aug. 5, 2024, after weeks of protests that have resulted in scores of deaths.

Her departure is a landmark moment, but one that has left the South Asian nation facing a power vacuum into which the army – for the time being, at least – has stepped.

To understand what led to the crisis and what could happen next, The Conversation turned to Tazreena Sajjad, an expert on Bangladeshi politics at American University’s School of International Service.

What sparked the demonstrations in Bangladesh?

The protests stem from long-running resentment over a quota system that saw 56% of government positions in Bangladesh reserved for various groups, including 30% for the descendants of freedom fighters who fought in the 1971 War of Independence.

This quota system has proved an enormous barrier to highly coveted civil service positions for the country’s large youth population, many of whom are unemployed.

It had also become a subject of controversy due to how many of those quota jobs went to supporters of the ruling Awami League party.

Under immense pressure from an earlier student mobilization over the issue, Hasina abolished the entire quota system in 2018.

But in June 2024, the country’s high court ruled that move illegal, sparking a fresh round of protests across the country.

Then, in July, Bangladesh’s public universities saw a series of walkouts by faculty and students over new pension reforms that, if implemented, would involve salary deductions.

Initially, the protests were peaceful, but an incendiary speech by Hasina – in which she suggested that the students were “rajakaar,” a term used to identify pro-Pakistan collaborators during Bangladesh’s War of Independence – inflamed tensions.

The Bangladesh Chhatra League – the armed wing of the Awami League – began attacking students with tear gas and live bullets, with support from the police. The Rapid Action Battalion, a controversial paramilitary group with a history of extrajudicial killings, torture and enforced disappearances, was also deployed.

After a video of one of the first to be killed – a university student named Abu Sayeed – circulated online, more joined the protests, leading to a further violent crackdown by police and armed groups.

It is estimated that about 266 people, mostly students, were killed in the protests, including at least 32 children.

The government closed schools and universities, imposed a curfew and cut internet and telecommunications. Meanwhile, student leaders were arrested and coerced to withdraw their list of demands.

But this only led to the declaration of a total noncooperation movement and a massive uprising of protesters demanding Hasina’s immediate resignation.

As thousands of protesters gathered for a long march to Dhaka in defiance of the curfew, the prime minister resigned and left the country.

Is there a wider context to the political unrest?

Absolutely. While attention has focused largely on the quota protests, a litany of grievances had piled up against the government.

Under Hasina’s rule, Bangladesh has seen GDP growth – but this has not translated into economic well-being for many Bangladeshis. Lack of opportunities, high unemployment rates among youth and soaring inflation have been ongoing sources of tension.

Meanwhile, despite the Awami League espousing a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption, money laundering, bribery and nepotism scandals have dogged government ministers.

And since its landslide victory in 2008, the Awami League has eroded the country’s democracy. For example, in 2011 the government ended an arrangement that allowed a 90-day caretaker administration, consisting of technocrats, to organize elections and oversee transfers of power.

Suppression of dissent has also grown. The harassment and detention of activists, opposition figures and human rights defenders have become more frequent. Meanwhile, there has been criminalization of any criticism of the government, including satire and social media posts.

Why is the 1971 war still relevant to Bangladeshi politics?

The War of Independence remains central to Bangladesh’s identity and its politics.

Its seeds were sown decades earlier in the 1947 British partition of the Indian subcontinent. This resulted in the violent division of the state of Bengal, with the eastern part becoming East Pakistan.

Where is Bangladesh?

After partition, West Pakistan tried to maintain political and economic dominance over East Pakistan, while at the same time attempting to cultivate a singular national identity – based on their common Muslim majority populations – despite separate cultures and linguistic heritages.

Policies to marginalize Bengali – the vernacular of 56% of then East Pakistanis – and “purify” East Pakistan from Hindu influence contributed to a backlash that saw widespread student protests and growing calls for independence.

In 1971, a West Pakistani military incursion aimed at snuffing out pro-independence sentiments resulted in a genocidal war with East Pakistan that lasted nine months and resulted in the deaths of 500,000 to 3 million Bangladeshis.

The circumstances of that war have shaped Bangladesh’s politics ever since. The parties that have dominated the country’s politics, including Hasina’s Awami League, frequently politicized their War of Independence credentials. Political leaders have also used 1971 as a means of legitimizing positions, shoring up support, or delegitimizing opposition parties.

Does Hasina’s exit mark the end of Bangladesh’s political dynasties?

The resignation of Hasina signals – at least for the time being – the end of Awami League rule in Bangladesh.

Countries in South Asia, including Bangladesh, have largely been shaped by political dynasties. So the rejection of the Awami League, and the fact that many are also rejecting other established political parties – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jatiya Party – is extraordinary.

These established parties will no doubt try to regroup. While the Awami League may not be able to effectively organize in the near future given public sentiment, the others will make a concerted effort to participate in the promised forthcoming elections.

For the moment, there may be an opportunity for Bangladesh to have fresh voices and faces in politics, potentially emerging from the student movement.

What should we make of the military taking interim control?

The Conversation for more

War, genocide and coups: Biden/Harris and the irreversible crisis of neoliberal fake democracy

by AJAMU BARAKA

One of the defining characteristics of the current crisis is the speed at which contradictory social, political and ideological dynamics can change with contradictions shifting from primary to secondary, antagonistic to non-antagonist and conflicts of interests, as well as struggles among the capitalist oligarchy producing new intra-bourgeois class alignments.

The replacement of Joe Biden as the presidential nominee of the democrat party was a dramatic demonstration that the lords of capital are the only segment of the U.S. population with real agency. The fact that select oligarchs, in this case, the cabal that actually runs the democrat party, can remove a presidential nominee and expeditiously anoint Kamala Harris as his replacement cannot be characterized as anything else but a coup.

While this might read as extreme, the situation that African and oppressed people face in the U.S. and globally is also extreme. From killer cops who occupy cities and college campuses across the country, to genocide in Gaza, naivety is a luxury that the oppressed cannot afford. The oppressed must have a clear and sober understanding of the class and power dynamics in the Democrat Party but also in the broader society.  The gangster move by the oligarchs that control the Democrats stripped away any pretense that any real structures of democracy exist in that party. 

Moreover, the ultimate expression of naivety would be to believe that it’s a mere coincidence that the driving forces of the coup are based in California and represent the same Silicon Valley class forces that attempted to impose Kamala Harris on U.S. voters in 2020.

That is why the specific details of how this drama unfolded, which is primarily the focus of the capitalist press is a diversion attempting to deflect attention away from the audacity and reality of oligarchical rule and the adaptation of regime change tactics that, up to now, were used primarily in nations in the Global South.

For almost two years it seemed obvious that Biden would not be a credible candidate in 2024 due to his noticeable cognitive decline and the ineptitude of his administration. This writer assumed that the decision was made as early as 2023 by the party bosses and Biden, but could not be made public because he would immediately become a lame-duck president. 

But clearly that conversation had not taken place. Apparently, the real plan, which reflects the general low-life character of the bosses of that party, was to clear the field of any viable opponents during the party’s phony primary process. The bosses understood how division may not have allowed Biden to capture all of the delegates and seamlessly permit him to appoint his successor – who was in reality their successor. The money for that successor was on Galvin Newsom, the telegenic airhead governor of California.

That the party bosses set Biden up to take part in the earliest debate in modern presidential election history knowing he was not up to the task was more illuminating than ever. It was a perfectly orchestrated symphony of treachery. Following his ignominious performance, the only problems the party encountered were Biden’s resistance and the annoyance that the Black base of the party would not allow the bosses to overlook Harris as a viable contender. Both of those problems were addressed and solved adroitly.

However, with the anointing of Kamala Harris, what does it suggest for the policies and direction of a Harris administration? Beyond the novelty of a run by Harris, would there be any substantial divergence from the policies and political trajectory of the Biden/Harris agenda?

No daylight between Biden and Harris:

“Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich – that is the democracy of capitalist society… Marx grasped this essence splendidly when he said that the oppressed are allowed once every few years to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class shall represent and repress them in parliament.” (V.I. Lenin)

Biden was a warrior for what became the neoliberal counterrevolution that was launched in the seventies. By the eighties, he worked in lock-step with the white supremacist, neoliberal Reagan administration in its assault on Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition and the Keynesian “welfare state,” supporting cuts in state expenditures for critical social services education, the environment, healthcare and more. By the nineties when the Soviet Union collapsed, Biden played a critical role in stripping away the rights of single women for state support (welfare reform) and championed the 1994 crime bill that generated the explosion of imprisonment, primarily of nationally oppressed Africans (Black people), Chicanos, Indigenousness peoples and poor whites.

Black Agenda Report for more

What is the realistic strategy for “de-dollarisation”?

by JOHN ROSS

Quarterly share o U.S. dollar in global reservesworldwide. 1999-2023. IMF (Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, International Financial Statistics) IMAGE/Statista

Introductory note

At present there is considerable discussion of avoiding the use of the U.S. dollar in international transactions, of alternatives to the dollar as a foreign exchange reserves asset etc. This is sometimes popularly referred to as “de-dollarisation”—although for reasons discussed below this is a confusing terminology.

The reason this discussion has developed, and will continue to deepen, is obvious. The U.S. has for many decades utilised unilateral economic sanctions against countries such as Cuba. In the recent period the U.S. has greatly expanded the range of countries such sanctions are used against—for example to Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and others. Even the supinely pro-U.S. The Economist estimates that the United States has increased use of sanctions fourfold since the 1990s.

The U.S. has furthermore progressively deepened the scale of these economic attacks by increasing the number of countries prevented from using the SWIFT international payments system, seizing hundreds of billions of dollars of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves etc. In the coming period the U.S. will expand such actions, because under conditions of “normal” peaceful competition, the U.S. is condemned to lose economically to socialist China (the reasons for this were analysed in the recent MR Online article “U.S. dooms itself to defeat in peaceful competition with China”). Therefore, to attempt to preserve its hegemony, the U.S. will be increasingly tempted to rip up the existing structure of the world economy—including the generally operating international payments system. Preparation of alternatives to the dollar system is therefore of the greatest importance not only analytically but even more so practically.

There should therefore not be the slightest underestimation of what is involved in this. The U.S. dollar is one of its most powerful and oppressive systems. Its use to help enforce other unilateral U.S. economic sanctions is responsible for the deaths of millions, more precisely tens of millions, of people in its direct and indirect consequences.

The U.S. international dollar system is also used to obtain economic resources from the rest of the world—the U.S. directly extracts approximately a trillion dollars year from other countries, which they could have used for their own development, in order to finance its own economy. A very large part of this is extracted because of the role of the dollar in the international system.

The U.S. dollar system is used as a key weapon to intimidate into adopting wrong economic policies, as well as a direct weapon against, numerous Global South countries.

The U.S. dollar system is now increasingly used to attack major countries, already Russia on a very large scale, and potentially against China.

Therefore, the dollar system is a political as well as an economic issue. Countries, to safeguard their own development, therefore need to see the destruction of the dollar system as a strategic political issue and in taking decisions on de-dollarisation must include this political aspect as well as purely economic ones.

The conclusion is therefore simple. Destruction of the U.S. international dollar system is a fundamental strategic goal of progressive forces—that is countries seeking an independent path of economic development and socialists. No stable progressive global economic order can be established without eventual destruction of the U.S. dollar system.

But precisely because it is such a fundamental issue, and an extremely powerful weapon of the U.S., how to deal with the international dollar system must be addressed with extreme seriousness and objectivity because any mistakes will be ruthlessly punished.

Given the importance of this issue, therefore, it is unfortunate a part of the international discussion on “de-dollarisation” is confused, and regrettably unrealistic, as it fails to clearly distinguish between two different issues.

  • First, the extremely important and urgent work on creation of alternatives to dollar payments, dollar reserves etc for those countries currently or prospectively facing the threat of such U.S. actions. This, as already stated, is crucial for the relatively small number of countries, involving a substantially larger part of the world economy, which already face unilateral U.S. sanctions—Russia, Iran, Cuba and others— as well as countries clearly facing the threat of U.S. sanctions such as China.
  • Second is a concept, put forward in some places, of a general replacement of the dollar system as the main means of international payment—that is a strategy of “de-dollarisation”. Regrettably, for reasons analysed in this article, no such general de-dollarisation is possible or will occur in the coming period. This is because, for fundamental economic reasons analysed below, the disadvantages of breaking with the dollar system for most countries are greater than the advantages—and therefore the majority of countries will not break with the dollar system. Presentation of “de-dollarisation” as a general strategy, because it will not work, would lead to discrediting of the forces putting it forward and possible monetary losses for any institutions attempting it. Such failures, by discrediting those advocating them, may then be used by the U.S. to undermine, and to urge avoiding taking, the very important necessary tactical measures to create alternative payments systems for those countries which are, or potentially will, face U.S. sanctions. As forces advocating putting forward such a general strategy of de-dollarisation have good and progressive intentions, but unfortunately a wrong analysis of the objective situation, it is necessary to have a friendly but firm discussion to clarify the issues involved.

1. The fundamental issues in “de-dollarisation” are not technical but economic

The fundamental reason for confusions is because “de-dollarisation” is sometimes wrongly envisaged as a technical issue—avoiding U.S. controlled payments systems such as SWIFT, creation of the technology for alternative systems to this etc. Or, to be more precise, what are presented as technical problems/issues are in fact fundamental issues of an economic system. In parallel, another part of this discussion presents alternatives such as “payment in national currency” as some sort of relatively simple alternative. But such conceptions are wrong and will therefore lead to erroneous conclusions as to what can practically be achieved.

There are certainly specifically technical issues of international payments system etc which must be tackled. But by far the most powerful and important questions involved in any discussion of “de-dollarisation” are not primarily technical but are economic. More precisely they are the inescapable consequences which flow from the most fundamental issues of a monetary system and therefore involve some of the most powerful of all global economic forces. These fundamental economic forces, and the consequences which flow from them, therefore determine what is and what is not practically possible in the present global situation in the coming period.

It should be made clear that this objective situation exists quite regardless of the fact that the U.S. gains great and unjustifiable advantages from the dollar’s role in the international system and in principle its replacement would be highly desirable. But in serious matters, as noted, of which “de-dollarisation” is very certainly one, it is necessary to strictly separate what is desirable in principle, and which will occur in the long turn, from what is practical in the coming period.

Because this issue is extremely important, and some confusion on it exists among forces that certainly have good and progressive intentions, this article therefore systematically examines the fundamental issues involved in the functioning of a monetary system which cannot be avoided—and their practical consequences.

2. The difference are over what is practical and why—not what is desirable

First, it should be made clear that there is no difference on the goal or what is desirable—that is to eliminate the international role of the dollar. The difference is over what is practically possible in what timescale, and therefore what role “de-dollarisation” can play in strategy.

Monthly Review Online for more

Hasina missing the point in post-protest Bangladesh

by FAISAL MAHMUD

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Shiekh Hasina is looking wobbly after a protest crackdown. IMAGE/ X Screengrab

Bangladeshi Prime Minister’s emphasis on economic damage over loss of human lives has put her out of touch with the people

Bangladesh is still shaking from violent student protests in recent weeks that resulted in over 170 deaths, a crackdown that has drawn unflattering global attention to the unprecedented brutality of police forces against civilians and an alleged government-enforced internet blackout that lasted for over five days.

As the situation starts to stabilize and internet access—at least for broadband—gradually resumes, grainy videos of students and ordinary citizens who protested for reforms in government job quotas are flooding social media. These videos show them being hit by bullets, pellets and relentless barrages of tear gas.

On the other hand, pro-government supporters are posting and sharing a counterstream of footage, including clips of vandalism during the protests punctuated by attacks on the country’s only metro rail system in Dhaka as well as on expressway and flyover toll booths on flyovers.

A video of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina crying upon seeing the damaged metro rail has gained significant traction and has been widely discussed and trolled online.

The general public’s perception of Hasina – who in January this year secured her fourth consecutive term through an opposition-less election – is a blend of fear, awe and apprehension.

Her administration’s heavy-handed suppression of protests and silencing of political opponents through intimidation, forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings are well-documented.

So, too, is her government’s legal harassment of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), whose members face an overwhelming number of cases against them.

However, it isn’t only the use of brute force or a subdued judiciary that has made Hasina the longest-serving female head of government in modern Bangladeshi history.

Her administration is skilled at first crafting a narrative against its perceived opponents and enemies and then persistently disseminating this narrative through the country’s mainstream media and its extensive network of activists.

Asia Times for more

The conundrums of Bangladeshi politics

by VIJAY PRASHAD

Former Banglasedh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed (left), protesters in capital Dhaka, and interim Prime Minister Dr Yunus Muhammad. IMAGE/Reuters/AP/Sky News

If the students are unable to build a historic bloc with the unions, they may be pushed to the side and they might have to surrender their efforts to the military and an elite that has merely changed its jersey

On Monday, 5 August, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina boarded a Bangladesh Air Force C-130J military transport in a hurry and fled to Hindon Air Force base, outside Delhi.

Her plane was refuelled and reports said that she intended to fly on either to the UK (her niece, Tulip Siddiq is a minister in the new Labour government), Finland (her nephew Radwan Mujib Siddiq is married to a Finnish national), or the US (her son Sajeeb Wajed Joy is a dual Bangladesh-US national).

Waker uz-Zaman, who only became Army Chief six weeks ago and is her relative by marriage, informed her earlier in the day that he was taking charge of the situation and would create an interim government to hold future elections.

Sheikh Hasina was the longest-serving prime minister in Bangladesh’s history. She was the prime minister from 1996 to 2001, and then from 2009 to 2024 – a total of 20 years. This was a sharp contrast to her father Sheikh Mujib, who was assassinated in 1975 after four years in power, or General Ziaur Rahman who was assassinated in 1981 after six years in power.

In a scene reminiscent of the end of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s rule in Sri Lanka, jubilant crowds of thousands crashed the gates of Ganabhaban, the official residence of the prime minister, and jubilantly made off with everything they could find.

Tanzim Wahab, photographer and chief curator of the Bengal Foundation, told me: “When [the masses] storm into the palace and make off with pet swans, elliptical machines and palatial red sofas, you can feel the level of subaltern class fury that built up against a rapacious regime.”

There was widespread celebration across Bangladesh, along with bursts of attacks against buildings identified with the government – private TV channels, and palatial homes of government ministers were a favoured target for arson.

Several local-level leaders in Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League have already been killed (Mohsin Reza, a local president of the party, was beaten to death in Khulna).

The situation in Bangladesh remains fluid, but it is also settling quickly into a familiar formula of an “interim government” that will hold new elections.

Political violence in Bangladesh is not unusual, having been present since the birth of the country in 1971. Indeed, one of the reasons why Sheikh Hasina reacted so strongly to any criticism or protest was her fear that such activity would repeat what she experienced in her youth. Her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1920-1975), the founder of Bangladesh, was assassinated in a coup d’état on 15 August 1975, along with most of his family.

Sheikh Hasina and her sister survived because they were in Germany at that time – the two sisters fled Bangladesh together on the same helicopter this week.

She has been the victim of multiple assassination attempts, including a grenade attack in 2004 that left her with a hearing problem. Fear of such an attempt on her life made Sheikh Hasina deeply concerned about any opposition to her, which is why up to 45 minutes before her departure she wanted the army to again act with force against the gathering crowds.

However, the army read the atmosphere. It was time for her to leave.

A contest has already begun over who will benefit from the removal of Sheikh Hasina.

On the one side are the students, led by the Bangladesh student uprising central committee of about 158 people and six spokespersons. Lead spokesperson Nahid Islam made the students’ views clear: “Any government other than the one we recommended would not be accepted. We won’t betray the bloodshed by the martyrs for our cause. We will create a new democratic Bangladesh through our promise of security of life, social justice and a new political landscape.”

At the other end are the military and the opposition political forces (including the primary opposition party Bangladesh National Party, the Islamist party Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and the small left party Ganosamhati Andolan).

While the army’s first meetings were with these opposition parties, a public outcry over the erasure of the student movement forced the army to meet with the student central committee and listen to their primary demands.

There is a habit called polti khawa or “changing the team jersey midway through a football match” that prevails in Bangladesh, with the military being the referee in charge at all times. This slogan is being used in public discourse now to draw attention to any attempt by the military to impose a mere change of jersey when the students are demanding a wholesale change of the rules of the game.

Aware of this, the military has accepted the student demand that the new government be led by economist Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s only Nobel Prize winner. Yunus, as the founder of the microcredit movement and promoter of “social business”, used to be seen as primarily a phenomenon in the neoliberal NGO world.

However, the Hasina government’s relentless political vendetta against him over the last decade, and his decision to speak up for the student movement have transformed him into an unlikely “guardian” figure for the protesters. The students see him as a figurehead, although his neoliberal politics of austerity might be at odds with their key demand, which is for employment.

Students

Even prior to independence and despite the rural character of the region, the epicentre of Bangladeshi politics has been in urban areas, with a focus on Dhaka.

Even as other forces entered the political arena, students remain key political actors in Bangladesh. One of the earliest protests in post-colonial Pakistan was the language movement (bhasha andolan) that emerged out of Dhaka University, where student leaders were killed during an agitation in 1952 (they are memorialised in the Shaheed Minar, or Martyrs’ Pillar, in Dhaka).

Students became a key part of the freedom struggle for liberation from Pakistan in 1971, which is why the Pakistani army targeted the universities in Operation Searchlight, which led to massacres of student activists.

The political parties that emerged in Bangladesh after 1971 grew largely through their student wings – the Awami League’s Bangladesh Chhatra League, the Bangladesh National Party’s Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatradal, and the Jamaat-e-Islami’s Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir.

Over the past decade, students in Bangladesh have been infuriated by the growing lack of employment despite the bustling economy, and by what they perceived as a lack of care from the government.

The latter was demonstrated to them by the callous comments made by Shajahan Khan, a minister in Sheikh Hasina’s government, who smirked as he dismissed news that a bus had killed two college students on Airport Road, Dhaka, in July 2019.

That event led to a massive protest movement by students of all ages for road safety, to which the government responded with arrests (including incarceration for 107 days of the photojournalist Shahidul Alam).

Behind the road safety protests, which earned greater visibility for the issue, was another key theme. Five years previously, in 2013, students who were denied access to the Bangladesh civil service began a protest over restrictive quotas for government jobs.

In February 2018, this issue returned through the work of students in the Bangladesh Sadharon Chhatra Odhikar Songrokkhon Parishad (Bangladesh General Students’ Rights Protection Forum).

When the road safety protests occurred, the students raised the quota issue (as well as the issue of inflation). By law, the government reserved seats in its employment for people in underdeveloped districts (10%), women (10%), minorities (5%) and the disabled (1%), as well as for descendants of freedom fighters (30%).

Aliran for more

A closer look at China in Africa

CODEPINK

We’re joined by Mikaela Erskog and Kambale Musavuli as they respond to Trevor Noah’s 12/16 The Daily Show episode “Why is China in Africa?”

Speakers:

• Mikaela “Mika” Nhondo Erskog is an educator and researcher working at the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, and a member of the organizing committee at No Cold War. She is also a part of media and research collective Dongsheng News.

• Kambale Musavuli, a native of the Democratic Republic of Congo and one of the leading political and cultural Congolese voices, is a human rights advocate and an analyst with the Center for Research on the Congo-Kinshasa.He is also one of the cofounders of the Andree Blouin Cultural Center in Kinshasa serving communities through cultural programs and international exchanges.

Youtube for more

Azerbaijan surfing the wave of brotherhood to Pakistan

by TARIQUE NIAZI

Ilham Aliyev meets Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif IMAGE/ from the website of the President of Azerbaijan (President.az.)

The two countries are building trade and energy links before the next big climate confab in Baku.

It is very rare that a leader from the southern Caucasus treks to a south Asian nation on business. But a blooming bromance between Azerbaijan and Pakistan has made this rarity routine. On July 11-12, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan landed in Islamabad on what Pakistan described a “state visit.” He received the protocol that Islamabad reserves for dignitaries from the United States and the People’s Republic of China. A pair of Pakistan’s sleek fighter jets escorted the presidential plane as soon as it entered the country’s airspace. While flanking him, the pilot of a Pakistani jet dived close to the president’s aircraft to greet him with a military salute.

As if this were not enough, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was waiting “in person” to receive Aliyev at a Pakistan Airforce Base in Islamabad. As the Pakistani president emerged from the plane, Sharif stretched his arms wide to embrace him. They had three customary bear hugs, before they walked to the VVIP (Very, Very Important Person) lounge. The prime minister Sharif held a big umbrella that shaded them both against the blistering sun and the temperature over 10o degrees. Summers in Islamabad are unusually cooler and winters milder. But climate change has turned the natural order of things upside down.

President Aliyev has been to Pakistan before, but not on a state visit. He was in Islamabad in 2017 to attend the annual summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), a 10-member regional alliance with its headquarters in Tehran, Iran. Only a week ago, he met with Prime Minister Sharif at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) summit that was held in Astana, Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan is a dialogue partner of the SCO.

In 2017, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey formed a Trilateral Summit Forum that meets yearly, most recently this month in Astana. One of the major features of this forum is defense and security cooperation. The three nations hold joint military exercises, like the one held in 2021 affectionately dubbed “Three Brothers.” Pakistan offered “political support” to Azerbaijan to help resolve its 30-year old conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

How effective is this alphabet soup of regional organizations? If you are Armenian, none at all. Armenia is a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) comprising six post-Soviet states. The treaty’s Article 4 echoes NATO in proclaiming “aggression against one is aggression against all.” When Azerbaijan and Armenia fought over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, neither Russia nor the CSTO lifted a finger to help disengage the parties, save tens of thousands of lives, or spare the dislocation of hundreds of thousands of Azeris and Armenian-Azeris.

Foreign Policy In Focus for more

World’s most dangerous man

by B. R GOWANI

VIDEO/Hindustan Times/Youtube

till July 31, 2024, Joe Biden was the world’s most dangerous man

he’s itching for a row with China to prove US is the lone super power

but that idiocy could lead to a wrong move by either party, the US or China

which could spell great disaster for the entire world

however, on July 31, Israeli Premier Netanyahu grabbed that title

his regime assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil

the Palestinian leader was Netanyahu’s counterpart in peace talks

but there is a method to Netanyahu’s genocidal madness …

he wants to hold on to power: to save his ass from court cases

Netanyahu got what he wanted; he’ll get even more

his government says ceasefire/hostages talk is on hold

why?

because, Iran, provoked by Israel, is going to retaliate for attack inside Iran

such a simple strategy …

like the US, Israel is preventing Iran from becoming another regional power

if Iranian retaliation results in a wider war, Netanyahu will be very happy

for long, he’s been trying to pit the United States in a war against Iran

he wants to destroy Iran and replace the current government with puppets

wisdom dictates that such an act could put the entire world on fire

Netanyahu can’t do it alone — never …

that’s why he tries to drag the US in some or other manner

not that the US doesn’t want a regime change in Iran …

it’s just that the US doesn’t want to fight the war overtly

Russia’s Vladimir Putin has asked Iran to avoid civilian casualties

Putin knows the Mid East is a tinderbox and Netanyahu wants to ignite it

on July 24, 2024, Netanyahu, unpopular in Israel, addressed the US Congress

Ramzy Baroud puts it nicely

“Isolated by much of the world, he rushed to the only place where he would feel safe, where people would clap for him unconditionally, even before he spoke: The US Congress.”

the 1st foreign leader to address a joint session of Congress for the 4th time

only a criminal Congress could invite Netanyahu, a mass murderer

International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu

Nadav Weiman, a former sergeant/sniper in the Israel Defense Forces said:

“Netanyahu came here to get standing ovations because he wouldn’t get any from anybody in Israel.”

(Modi, too, who escapes India’s misery — which he greatly worsened

finds solace in the arms of Trump, Zuckerberg, and others)

23 standing ovations were part of 39 applauses

a total of 10 mins & 55 secs out of the total speech of 40 mins & 30 secs

i.e., 27% of the time was allotted to sycophants to elevate & drop their ass

(about half of the House and Senate Democrats boycotted his speech

that is, almost of 25% of members

Rashida Tlaib, the only Palestinian in Congress, attended the session

she was holding a sign that said “guilty of genocide” on one side

where as the other side read “war criminal)

Netanyahu, as is his habit, lied wholeheartedly:

“We meet today at a crossroads of history. Our world is in upheaval. In the Middle East, Iran’s axis of terror confronts America, Israel and our Arab friends. This is not a clash of civilizations. It’s a clash between barbarism and civilization. It’s a clash between those who glorify death and those who sanctify life.”

this “genocidal maniac” has killed over 40,263 Palestinians since Oct 7, 2023

and he talks of the sanctity of life!

and he was applauded gloriously for his wicked evil sanctimony

B. R. Gowani can be reached at brgowani@hotmail.com

Arab Jews: The hidden history | Ash Sarkar meets Avi Shlaim

A foundational principle of the state of Israel is that it keeps Jews safe. This principle has been profoundly challenged in the last nine or so months. But what if Israel never really had the will or capacity to keep all Jews safe and, in fact, has made them less safe?

Avi Shlaim is a historian and author of “Three Worlds: Memoirs of an Arab-Jew”. He joined Ash to talk about the Israeli right, Mossad’s covert operations in Baghdad and what it means to have hyphenated identities.

00:00 Intro 01:36 Experience of Arab Jews Pre-1948 11:07 When Did Things Change? 20:34 Ethnicity in Contemporary Israel 35:13 Jabotinsky 38:25 Jewish Safety and Zionism 44:24 Mossad and Iraqi Jewish Displacement 54:24 Zionists and the Jewish Diaspora 01:02:13 Hybrid Identity

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