by NORMAN FINKELSTEIN
Christopher Hitchens (1949-2011). PHOTO/The Nation
Z Net Editor’s note: Norman G. Finkelstein is currently writing a political memoir, which will serve as the introduction to a new edition of his book, The Rise and Fall of Palestine, to be published by New Press next year. Below is an excerpt from the memoir on the subject of political apostasy. The title refers to how ex-leftist Christopher Hitchens used to sign off his correspondence.
Depending on where along the political spectrum power is situated, apostates almost always make their corrective leap in that direction, discovering the virtues of the status quo. “The last thing you can be accused of is having turned your coat,” Thomas Mann wrote a convert to National Socialism right after Hitler’s seizure of power. “You always wore it the `right’ way around.” If apostasy weren’t conditioned by power considerations, one would anticipate roughly equal movements in both directions. But that’s never been the case. The would-be apostate almost always pulls towards power’s magnetic field, rarely away. However elaborate the testimonials on how one came to “see the light,” the impetus behind political apostasy is – pardon my cynicism – a fairly straightforward, uncomplicated affair: to cash in, or keep cashing in, on earthly pleasures. Indeed, an apostate can even capitalize on the past to increase his or her current exchange value. Professional ex-radical Todd Gitlin never fails to mention, when denouncing those to his left, that he was a former head of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Never mind that this was four decades ago; although president of my sixth-grade class 40 years ago, I don’t keep bringing it up. Shouldn’t there be a statute of limitations on the exploitation of one’s political past? In any event, it’s hard to figure why an acknowledgment of former errors should enhance one’s current credibility. If, by a person’s own admission, he or she had got it all wrong, why should anyone pay heed to his or her new opinions? Doesn’t it make more sense attending to those who got there sooner rather than later? A member of the Flat-Earth Society who suddenly discovers the world is round doesn’t get to keynote an astronomers’ convention. Indeed, the prudent inference would seem to be, once an idiot, always an idiot. It’s child’s play to assemble a lengthy list – Roger Garaudy, Boris Yeltsin, David Horowitz, Bernard Henri-Levy… – bearing out this commonsensical wisdom.
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Hitchens collects his essays during the months preceding the U.S. attack on Iraq in The Long Short War. He sneers that former comrades organizing the global anti-war demonstrations “do not think that Saddam Hussein is a bad guy at all” (emphasis in original), and the many millions marching in them consist of the “blithering ex-flower child or ranting neo-Stalinist.” Similarly, he ridicules activists pooling their meager resources for refreshments at a fundraiser – they are not among the chosen at a Vanity Fair soiree – as “potluck peaceniks” and “potluckistas.”
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On one page Hitchens states that the world fundamentally changed after September 11 because “civilians are in the front line as never before,” but on another page he states that during the 1970s, “I was more than once within blast or shot range of the IRA and came to understand that the word `indiscriminate’ meant that I was as likely to be killed as any other bystander.” On one page he states that, even if the U.S. doesn’t attack or threaten to attack, “Saddam Hussein is not going to survive. His regime is on the verge of implosion” (emphasis in original), but on another page he states that “only the force of American arms, or the extremely credible threat of that force, can bring a fresh face to power.” On one page he states that the U.S. seems committed to completely overhauling Iraq’s political system, but on another page he states that replacing Saddam with “another friendly general…might be ideal from Washington’s point of view.” On one page he states that “Of course it’s about oil, stupid” (emphasis in original), but on another page he states that “it was not for the sake of oil” that the U.S. went to war. In one paragraph he states that the U.S. must attack Iraq even if it swells the ranks of al-Qaida, but in the next paragraph he states that “the task of statecraft” is not to swell its ranks. In one sentence he claims to be persuaded by the “materialist conception of history,” but in the next sentence he states that “a theory that seems to explain everything is just as good at explaining nothing.” In the first half of one sentence he argues that, since “one cannot know the future,” policy can’t be based on likely consequences, but in the second half he concludes that policy should be based on “a reasoned judgment about the evident danger.”
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