by MUSA OZUGURLU
With Damascus fallen and Sanaa under bombardment, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seizing a renewed opportunity to reassert Muslim Brotherhood influence across the Arab world – from Syria and Lebanon to Jordan and Yemen.
During the so-called Arab Spring, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan envisioned reviving Neo-Ottoman ambitions through ideological alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood. But as Brotherhood-linked movements faltered, especially after Egypt’s 2013 coup, those plans were shelved.
Now, 14 years later, with Damascus fallen and regional dynamics shifting, Erdogan sees an opening to rekindle the Brotherhood’s influence.
That influence now extends far beyond Syria and Egypt, with Brotherhood-affiliated movements resurging across Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen – regions where Erdogan has maintained deep, often unofficial, networks of support.
Turkiye’s Islamist turn and Brotherhood networks
Erdogan never truly abandoned his broader regional agenda. Over the years, he gradually shifted Turkiye’s secular foreign policy to a more aggressive, Islamist-aligned approach – reaching out not only to states but also to ideologically aligned organizations and individuals.
That included offering state support to controversial figures like Tariq al-Hashimi, the former Iraqi vice president sentenced to death in Iraq, who received both a vehicle and driver from Istanbul’s municipal government under Erdogan’s rule.
Most notably, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood found refuge in Istanbul after being designated a terrorist organization by Cairo. Some members even aired broadcasts calling for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s assassination – beaming their message from Turkish soil. Erdogan’s strategic alliance with Qatar further solidified his patronage of the Brotherhood, creating friction with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
A legacy of Brotherhood ties
Erdogan’s ideological affinity with the Brotherhood is rooted in decades of Turkish-Islamist history. As noted by Professor Behlul Ozkan of Ozyegin University, Brotherhood figures such as Said Ramadan – the son-in-law of founder Hassan al-Banna – were forging ties with Turkish Islamists as early as the 1950s. In this context, Erdogan became both a product of and a model for Brotherhood-aligned movements.
His open backing of Egypt’s late former President Mohamed Morsi included dispatching the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) chief propagandist, Erol Olcok, to assist in Morsi’s campaign. Yet the Brotherhood’s defeats – from Cairo to Tunisia – necessitated a tactical recalibration.
When Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt blockaded Qatar, Erdogan firmly sided with Doha, triggering years of strained ties with the Arab trio.
Eventually, rapprochements with these regional powers forced Erdogan to tone down overt Brotherhood ties. But behind the scenes, the groundwork for renewed cooperation persisted – especially through Syria, where Erdogan has actively supported groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the successor to Al-Qaeda affiliate the Nusra Front, which now forms the backbone of the new Syrian government.
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