by TIM BEAL
THAAD on the Korean peninsula, used for detecting Chinese ICBM (hypothetical)
On 8 July 2016 it was announced in Seoul that the US would, as had long been anticipated, deploy an initial unit of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea.1 The announcement was made at a press conference hosted by the South Korean Deputy Minister of Defense Ryu Je-seung and the Chief of Staff of US Forces in Korea (USFK) who has the significant, if unfortunate, name of General Vandal. The decision did not attract much attention in the international media being overshadowed by the Brexit drama in Europe, shootings and electioneering in the US, and Obama’s last NATO summit in Warsaw.
The limited coverage however was definitely ‘on message’:
- US and South Korea agree THAAD missile defence deployment (BBC)2
- South Korea and US agree to deploy THAAD missile defence system (Guardian)3
- Pentagon to deploy anti-missile system in South Korea (Washington Post)4
- South Korea and US Agree to Deploy Missile Defense System (New York Times)5
It was Reuters which delivered the whole message in the headline:
South Korea, US Agree to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense to Counter North Korea Threat6
So, the message goes, we have two equal allies–South Korea and the US (and that is often the order in which they are given) –who after much deliberation are stationing this segment of Missile Defense precisely to defend South Korea against a belligerent North Korea. It must be admitted that China7 and Russia8 are making a bit of a fuss although it has been patiently explained many times that the sole purpose of THAAD was, as Minister Yoo reiterated at the press conference “to guarantee the security of [South Korea] and its people from the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles” and is “not aimed at a third country”9. Indeed, Jane Perlez suggested in the New York Times, China was peeved because the deployment show that despite its attempts to woo Seoul ‘Ms. Park’s government showed that it was embracing its alliance with Washington more than ever, and that it would rely less on China to keep North Korea and its nuclear arsenal at bay.’10
However, a little burrowing beneath the surface reveals that the reality is very different from the official US and South Korean government line so assiduously reported by the media.
There are, for a start, serious doubts amongst experts that THAAD would in fact be effective against North Korean missiles. Even those in the military-industrial-security complex such as Michael Elleman formerly of the US Department of Defense and now with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) who is, by profession, ‘pro-THAAD’ cautions that it would not offer complete protection.