By Joseph Ball
Mizzima News – Of the multitude of flaws commonly leveled against the standing 2008 constitution, typically at or near the top of the list is the 25 percent of reserved seats in parliament for appointees of the armed forces. Reasoning follows that the parameter was included as a means of safeguarding the interests of the armed forces. A bloc of military parliamentarians it is presumed will vote as a single entity. But, is this a realistic assumption? And should the inclusion of the clause be deemed a non-starter by the democratic opposition?
Put succinctly, the military in parliament must not be approached as an infinite, absolutist bloc. Just as representatives within a functioning multiparty democratic apparatus cannot be 100 percent relied upon to blindly follow the national party’s line, neither should a military bloc in parliament be expected to automatically hold rank.
Further, the situation in Burma necessitates a high level of security sector reform. This should be a crucial task assigned parliament. However, the lead in this goal – though by no means the sole prerogative, likely falls under the jurisdiction of the armed forces. As de facto political actors, implementation of security sector reform in regional cases has conformed to this trend.
Not only were “the Habibie administration’s most assertive strides towards democratization taken, ironically, by two generals with hardline reputations: Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid and Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah,” according to Indonesian security expert Peter O’Rourke, a similar observation can be made of the actions of military appointed parliamentarians and proxy parties both during and post-Suharto rule.
While still in power, Suharto’s political support base within the armed forces and Golkar, essentially a political organization invented to serve the establishment, split on the question of whether to use force in quelling domestic unrest. Following Suharto’s fall, the military’s representation in the MPR, People’s Consultative Assembly, showed that it was in fact anything but a tool in the hands of the establishment. When Habibie, the hand picked successor of Suharto, came up against a no-confidence measure, significant numbers of seated military representatives chose not to support the government.
Vocal in their support of security sector reform, the armed forces representation in the MPR nominally decreased from 75 to 38 seats, before being phased out – ahead of schedule – in its entirety in 2004.
The deal struck that permitted the above scenario to play itself out, however, was contingent upon the armed forces themselves being authorized to formulate their own reform agenda. This right, in turn, was only agreed upon confirmation of the military committing to eventually remove itself from the overt political process. The removal of the military from appointed positions within parliament was a vocal demand of the reform-minded democratic opposition in Indonesia – as it is in the case of Burma.
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