by A. G. NOORANI
New Delhi, July 20, 1950: Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan (holding pen) and Jawaharlal Nehru of India meeting with Sir Owen Dixon (center), United Nations mediator on Kashmir. “I must have Kashmir,” Nehru is said to have once told Liaquat Ali Khan PHOTO/The Hindu Archives
“I MUST have Kashmir.”—Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan (Lionel Carter Ed.; Weakened States Seeking Renewal: British Official Reports from South Asia, Part 1; Manohar; page 416).
“From all the information that I have, 95 per cent of Kashmiri Muslims do not wish to be or remain Indian citizens. I doubt therefore the wisdom of trying to ‘keep’ people by force where they do not wish to stay. This cannot but have serious long-term political consequences, though immediately it may suit policy and please public opinion.”—Jayaprakash Narayan’s letter to Nehru, May 1, 1956 (Bimal Prasad (Ed.), Selected Works of Jayaprakash Narayan; Vol. 7; Manohar; page 115).
“If Kashmir remains with India against the will of the State’s people it will always find itself in political turmoil.” —Prem Nath Bazaz, a close associate of Sheikh Abdullah in the National Conference; The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir; Pamposh Publications; 1954).
“Behind the facade of the constitutional apparatus rests the nitty-gritty of rude fact: the Valley is an occupied territory; remove for a day India’s Army and security forces and it is impossible to gauge what might transpire at the next instant. Some of the stone-pelters may nurse illusions about Pakistan, some may think in terms of a sovereign, self-governing Kashmir, but they certainly do not want to be any part of India… the great Indian nation, with its load of civilisation stretching 5,000 years, is extraordinarily mum.…
“One is suddenly hit by a fearsome realisation: Indians by and large do not perhaps feel at all, this way or that, about the Valley’s people. In other words, the Indian nation is alienated from Kashmir” (Ashok Mitra; The Telegraph, August 27, 2010).
Mir Qasim opposed Sheikh Abdullah in 1953, became Chief Minister, presided over rigged elections and joined Indira Gandhi’s Cabinet. Asked, “What do the people of Kashmir demand?”, he replied: “They clearly say that they would not like to remain in India. They would like to go out of India. They ask for a plebiscite so that they will be allowed to answer whether they want to remain in India or go out of India.” This was written in 1992.
What the country has witnessed since July 8, 2016, in Kashmir is not one of the periodic “eruptions” there. It is far graver than even the grave one of 2010 following the murder of Tufail Mattoo. That subsided; as did the previous ones, fortifying long-held delusions in India. But this one was a virtual revolt waiting to happen. It will linger. I write “virtual” advisedly, for it is still not quite a revolt proper. But that can well occur with fearful consequences. When news arrived at Versailles of the fall of the Bastille in 1789, Louis XVI asked, “Is it a revolt?” La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt gave the perfect reply, “No, Sir, it is a revolution.” No army can forever subdue a people who reject rule by those who sent it across to subdue them.
2016 only proves, yet once again, that the people of Kashmir have not acquiesced in the State of Jammu & Kashmir’s accession to India which the tribal raiders from Pakistan, sent on October 22, 1947, criminally ensured by force majeure.
That was how the First Kashmir Crisis began, though Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel had begun their intrigues to secure Kashmir through the Maharaja since at least June 1947 regardless of Sheikh Abdullah who was in prison and with full knowledge of the people’s opposition to it. Nehru wanted Kashmir, anyhow. Nearly 70 years later, we are facing the consequences of that territorial greed. It ensured popular backing which Nehru craved for. Some in the media and academia have enlisted themselves in the service of the State; others go along in a mistaken notion of nationalism.
Having acquired the nuclear option, and frustrated at India’s obstinate refusal to negotiate the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan decided to use force in 1989 covertly as it had done earlier openly in 1965. A spark was lit. A people, inflamed by India’s behaviour, accepted Pakistan’s gun. In an interview to Sunday (March 18, 1990), Amanullah Khan said, “Our armed struggle started on 31 July 1988 by blasting three buildings belonging to the Government of India in Srinagar.” M.A. Niazi revealed in The Nation (Lahore, May 21, 1990) that the “operations mounted during the late Zia-ul-Haq’s time caused fierce debate in policy-making circles with opponents warning that such activities would cause war”. This venture petered out. Kashmir has 200 militants now, mostly local. It is not Pakistan but the people of Kashmir who have had to face the consequences since 1990. The Second Kashmir Crisis ended militarily; but it made the people assertive.
Mehbooba was in the loop
The Third Kashmir Crisis of 2016 is far worse. The Valley is no longer “on the boil”. It is in an incipient revolt which can get worse. It builds on the renewed awakening through militancy and is mostly local in origin. Therein lies the significance of Burhan Muzaffar Wani. This 22-year-old tech-savvy militant became an icon. He had to be done away with. Reportedly, a decision to “take him out” was taken at the highest level in New Delhi. Shiv Murari Sahai, Additional Director General of Police, called a hurried press conference on July 9 to confirm Wani’s death.
Showkat A. Motta reported from Srinagar: “By the time it was over, at least 13 protesters had fallen to security forces’ bullets. Sahai said Mehbooba [Mufti, the Chief Minister] also the Home Minister knew of the op” (Onlooker, July 25, 2016). On July 24, Indian Express carried a report from Kashmir which confirmed this. “Highly placed sources said she was informed, in writing, of the June 8 raid as well as an operation targeting Burhan Wani in March” (emphasis added, throughout).
These authoritative disclosures prove four things: (1) The decision to kill Wani was taken in March 2016 by New Delhi; (2) Mehbooba Mufti was in the loop about the entire operation and did not object; (3) She was also informed “in writing” of the raid on July 8 in pursuance of the decision of March. It was timed for execution immediately after the Ramzan Id; (4) Her statement that she learnt of the killing in the evening of July 8 just as she had finished her prayers is an elaborate falsehood. This is in keeping with the disgraceful action against the press on July 16. A government spokesman said it was “in view of apprehensions of serious trouble in Kashmir in the next three days” (The Hindu, July 17). Nayeem Akhtar, a Minister and spokesman, said, “The undesirable step was taken to ensure peace” (Hindustan Times, July 17). On July 18, Mehbooba Mufti’s “political adviser”, one Amitabh Mattoo, said action would be taken against officials who had acted thus. On July 19, he said Mehbooba was not in the know (Hindustan Times, July 20). All three emerged with battered credibility. The editors refused to resume publication unless the State “owns the ban”.
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