By Alexander Sodiqov
Tajikistani President Emomali Rahmon’s state visit to Moscow in October resolved none of the major divisive issues marring the relations between Moscow and Dushanbe. The Tajik leader failed to convince President Medvedev to pay Tajikistan a rent for Russia’s military base in Tajikistan, and to participate in the Rogun power station project. Despite this, security considerations have pushed Dushanbe and Moscow to agree to step up military cooperation. This, however, is more a matter of necessity than choice for the both sides, and is unlikely to produce a lasting normalization of relations between the two countries.
BACKGROUND: Over the last two years, Tajikistan’s relationship with Russia has deteriorated to its worst level since independence. The major reason for Tajik frustration with Russia has been what many in Tajikistan view as a failure on Moscow’s part to honor its commitment to build the Rogun power station. Under the 2004 deal, Russian aluminum giant Rusal pledged to invest roughly US$2 billion in building the Soviet-planned power giant. In return, Dushanbe agreed to the reorganization of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan into a permanent military base to be deployed in the country free of charge. Under the same deal, Moscow wrote off US$242 million of Tajik debt, and Dushanbe handed over a major space-surveillance facility to the Russian space forces.
Despite the signing of the deal, brokered personally by the then-president Vladimir Putin, Russia has not yet invested in the Rogun project. Facing strong pressure from Uzbekistan, Rusal attempted to persuade Dushanbe to change the height and type of the dam. Unwilling to agree to a lower dam project, Dushanbe cancelled the deal with Rusal in 2007 and pressed Moscow for an alternative arrangement to build the power station. These efforts have so far yielded no result.
Rising power demand, failing infrastructure and inability to negotiate transit of electricity from neighboring states through Uzbek territory during the last several winters led Dushanbe to introduce strict power supply rationing and leave entire regions without electricity and heating. The Rogun power station is currently seen as the only feasible project that could not only resolve Tajikistan’s electricity deficits but also make the country a net power exporter. Therefore, the construction of the Rogun power plant has become a matter of necessity rather than choice for Tajikistan. Dushanbe began building the power station on its own, investing US$120 million in the project in 2009, and planning to spend roughly US$150 million from the state budget in 2010.
Disappointed with Moscow’s reluctance to deliver the promised investment in the Rogun project, Tajik media, intellectuals and part of the political elite began demanding that the government revisit the 2004 deal and begin charging Russia for hosting its military base. Both Tajik and Russian media cited unnamed sources in Tajikistan’s defense ministry as suggesting that Dushanbe had demanded US$300 million in annual rent fees from Moscow. Moreover, as discussed in previous issues of the CACI Analyst, many in Tajikstan have felt offended by Moscow’s stance on water management issues in the region, an inability to stem the wave of ethnically motivated attacks on Tajik migrants in Russia, and media coverage they perceived as insulting.
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