by INAM AHMED & SHAKHAWAT LITON
Lieutenant General AAK Niazi, commander of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan, signs the Instrument of Surrender at the Race Course in Dhaka on this day in 1971 PHOTO/Collected
“Hello Abdullah!” Gen Nagra extended his hand to Gen Niazi. The two stood at Niazi’s office. Two old course mates. One was the victor, the other, vanquished. The genocide at Bangladesh by the Pakistanis had come to an end.
It was a treacherous journey. On bull-carts and on foot. But it was the journey that finally led to the fall of Dhaka in 1971 and the victory for Bangladesh and its 75 million Bangalis.
Major General Gandharv Singh Nagra advanced with his two brigades of soldiers with lightning speed from the north. He had just replaced Major General Gurbax Gill who was injured when his jeep hit a mine on December 5.
And now on this chilly winter morning of December 9, Nagra crossed the river to the south of Jamalpur. There was a formidable Pakistani troop position in Kamalpur that showed tough fighting spirit. So it was better to bypass it, cut its retreating line and then move fast towards Dhaka, the ultimate target.
The troops could hardly wait for the final push — the final battle. Let it be bitter and bloody but let it be over quickly, was the mood.
Nagra’s two brigades of troops linked up with the Indian paratroopers who were dropped over there earlier. He then marched off towards Joydevpur and met a strong resistance from the Pakistan army. So Nagra left one of his brigades there to engage the enemy and took the second brigade with him to proceed. They crossed a river and marched towards Tongi.
But then Nagra changed his mind. Probably because information was there that he would meet stiff resistance. In front of him was a newly built road east of Kaliakair that linked up with Dhaka-Aricha highway. It was still unmarked on the map.
On December 14, General Nagra decided to place his bet on this axis and rapidly marched forward. On the way they had a bitter skirmish at Savar.
But then very early in the morning on December 16 he reached Mirpur, an outskirt of Dhaka. His troops took position across the Mirpur bridge and waited. A lull before the final battle.
Nagra had only 3,000 troops with him to take on 26,000 Pakistani soldiers hell-bent on saving Dhaka.
When the game was over
Meanwhile, in Dhaka a different drama was unfolding.
On December 14, Pakistan president Yahya Khan had sent a cable to General AAK Niazi, the commander of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan, and Governor AM Malik.
“You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds…. You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer HUMANLY possible nor will it serve any useful purpose. You should now take all necessary MEASURES TO STOP THE FIGHTING….,” the message read.
Just a little while ago, Niazi had visited a Bihari camp in Mohammadpur and boasted to journalists, “We will fight it out till the last. It is the price of freedom. Pakistan will stay, yes, Inshallah, we will stay.”
And now when he got the president’s cable, Niazi’s hands trembled. He knew the full meaning of this message. It was a moment no career soldier ever expected to see. The most loathsome, most ignominious moment of his life had arrived. The decision to lay down arms, to surrender to the enemy, was his to take.
NEGOTIATING SURRENDER
In the evening, Niazi and General Rao Farman Ali rushed to US consul general Spivack and asked him to negotiate the cease-fire terms with the Indians for him.
“I cannot negotiate a cease-fire on your behalf. I can only send a message if you like,” Spivack said in a matter-of-fact tone.
So General Rao Farman drafted the message addressed to Indian Chief of Staff General Sam Manekshaw, according to Siddiq Salik’s book “Witness to surrender.”
It called for an immediate case-fire, safety of Pakistan Armed and paramilitary forces, the protection of the loyal civilian population against reprisals by the Mukti Bahini and the safety and medical care of the sick and the wounded.
Spivack promised to transmit the message in twenty minutes. But he actually sent it to Washington to get comments on Yahya Khan. Nobody knew where Yahya was at that moment in time.
Finally when it reached General Manekshaw, the Indian chief of staff immediately replied. The cease fire would be acceptable provided the Pakistan Army surrendered. He also provided the radio frequency 6605 KHz by day and 3216 kHz by night with a call sign CALBAC on which Kolkata, the seat of Indian Eastern Command, could be contacted for co-ordination of details.
The Daily Star for more