Intransigence of India and Pakistan over Kashmir:

by NYLA ALI KHAN

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917 – 1984) and Pakistani President, later Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1928 – 1979) in Simla, India in 1972. PHOTO/Mid Day

In the wake of India’s recent assertion of the validity of the Simla Agreement, which, in official circles, undermines the legitimacy of any third-party interference in the Kashmir issue and diminishes the role of the international community, it is important to recapitulate the circumstances that led to the weakening of the Pakistani standpoint on Kashmir. It is also important to remember that the validity of the UN charter as governing relations between the two countries remained intact.

The 1965 Indo–Pak war proved disastrous for both nation-states. In an attempt to save face, the two sides agreed to a UN-mediated cease-fire, which took place on 23 September 1965, in Tashkent, Russia. Talks between Russian Premier Alexei Kosygin, Indian Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Pakistani President Ayub Khan led to the ratification of an agreement, the Tashkent Declaration. Alastair Lamb (1991: 269) writes about the atmosphere, characterized by tact and diplomacy, in which the talks took place:

“In the era of Khrushchev the Soviet Union had publicly declared itself a supporter of the Indian stand on Kashmir. In 1962 a Russian veto had defeated a Security Council resolution on the plebiscite issue. By 1965, and after the fall of the Khrushchev regime, Russian attitudes were significantly modified. When President Ayub Khan visited Moscow in early April 1965, Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, showed himself far more flexible in outlook than Khrushchev had ever been. No doubt he was looking for some means to reduce Chinese support in Rawalpindi.”

The Tashkent Declaration emphasized the resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan through peaceful negotiations, and a rapprochement that would facilitate the development of amity between the two countries. In other words, the Kashmir conflict was consigned to a position of reduced political import. The declaration was perceived by the people of both India and Pakistan as a despicable act of evasion and was received with hostility by them: “Despite domestic opposition, both sides did respect the terms of the Declaration at least as far as practical measures were concerned. Prisoners of war were repatriated. . . . However, respecting the spirit of the Declaration (resolving disputes peacefully, promoting friendly relations) proved more difficult” (Malik 2002: 124–25). The disregard of the will of the people and the steady dissolution of democratic institutions caused colossal damage in the state of J & K.

Despite the publicly voiced protestations by people who had access to the higher echelons of power, the 1967 elections in Indian-administered J & K did not bear testimony to India’s democratic façade. Congress candidates supported by the Sadiq–Qasim faction of the NC won in 33 of the Valley’s 42 constituencies, 27 of Jammu’s 31 constituencies, and 1 of Ladakh’s 2 constituencies––indubitably a large number. The draconian nature of the 1967 electoral process inIndian-administered J & K further entrenched corruption in the soil of the political culture, which is a yoke from which the people of the state, thus far, have not been able to free themselves. The official candidate from the southern Kashmir town of Anantnag was Khwaja Shamsuddin, who had been the prime minister of Indian-administered J & K for a few months in 1962–1963. Predictably, he was elected unopposed after papers filed by five other candidates were summarily invalidated. Of the 118 candidates whose papers were nullified, 55 were rejected because the candidates had declared their unwillingness to take the mandatory oath of allegiance to India. The government efficiently deployed the machinery and infrastructure available to it in order to ensure the victory of its political organization, winning 61 of the 75 seats. Clearly, India had left no stone unturned to ensure the victory of its cronies and the defeat of its ideological and political opponents. New Delhi’s master of subterfuge greased the wheels of rampant deployment of governmental machinery to ease the path of the ruling party to victory and to delegitimize dissident politics. The use of such discreditable methods enabled the Congress to create the semblance of a base for itself in the Valley, which, prior to these elections, had been nonexistent.

An unforeseen development that election year was the opposition of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, prime minister of Indian-administered J & K from 1953 to 1963, to the Congress parliamentary candidateas Srinagar constituency candidate for the straggling faction of the NC. In an interesting reversal of political fortunes, Bakshi’s faction of the NC won 7 seats in the Valley and 1 in Jammu that year. Not one to be easily slighted, the heretofore autocrat, known for his corrupt politics and brutal repression of dissent, proclaimed himself a Kashmir nationalist who was willing to fight tooth and nail against the centrist and integrative policies of New Delhi. This sudden and unexpected shift to regionalism and Kashmiri nationalism was Bakshi’s ticket to the Indian Parliament. He was elected as the parliamentary representative from Srinagar. The status of the ruling faction as a nonentity was reinforced when the brief release of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah from incarceration in 1968 was greeted with overwhelming jubilation in the Valley. The “Lion of Kashmir” was welcomed by the people with such uninhibited exuberance and joy that the foundations of the Congress in the Valley were palpably shaken. Soon after his release, Abdullah addressed a mammoth gathering in Anantnag on 26 January 1968, in which he unhesitatingly voiced his dissident ideology. He made it clear that India’s undemocratic and oppressive tactics would not inhibit the passionate desire of the Kashmiri people to be free. He also reminded India of its unfulfilled promise to hold a referendum in Kashmir and enable the people to exercise their right of self-determination. Sheikh Abdullah’s disillusionment with Indian democracy created political and personal acrimony:

“Respect for the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, the integrity of the electoral process––are all sought to be guaranteed by the Indian constitution. It is not surprising that many other countries have drawn upon this constitution, particularly the chapter on fundamental rights. Yet it must at all times be remembered that the constitution provides the framework, and it is for the men who work it to give it life and meaning. In many ways the provisions of the constitution have been flagrantly violated [in Kashmir] and the ideals it enshrines completely forgotten. Forces have arisen which threaten to carry this saddening and destructive process further still.”

(Speeches and Interviews of Sher-e-Kashmir 1968: 15–16; quoted in Bose 2003: 46)

In the wake of armed insurrection, genocide, extortions, exoduses, and state-sponsored atrocities, Abdullah’s prediction has proved frighteningly accurate. His sharp delineation of India’s antidemocratic strategies has proved to be the prognosis of a farsighted populist leader.

Subsequent to the large-scale arrests of leaders and members of the Plebiscite Front, elections were held in the state in 1971–1972 in which the Congress orchestrated a landslide victory for itself, managing to acquire 5 out of 6 parliamentary seats and 56 out of 73 assembly seats. That year the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) gained visibility in the politically disputed state by garnering support to win 2 seats in Jammu.

In another unforeseen and interesting development, a pro-Pakistan religious organization, Jamaat-i-Islami––which had insistently disavowed Kashmir’s accession to India, and is currently a vocal opponent of elections held in Indian-administered J & K within the framework of the Constitution of India––in a tacit understanding with the Qasim regime, managed to get 5 representatives accommodated in the Legislative Assembly. In the parliamentary election, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad again contested from Srinagar. Only this time he disavowed his Kashmiri nationalism and was patronized by the official regime with its unitary politics of Indian nationalism.

After the 1971 Indo–Pak war India had become a force to contend with, and the ability of Pakistan to challenge that power had been greatly reduced. The display of India’s superior military strength and strategic dexterity during that war diminished Pakistan’s stature. The Simla Agreement, ratified in 1972 by then Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi soon after the 1971 war, underlined the bilateral nature of the Kashmir issue; entrenched the cease-fire line, thereafter referred to as the Line of Control (LOC); reinforced the validity of the UN charter as governing relations between the two countries; and agreed to reaching a final settlement of the disputed area in the former princely state of J & K (Margolio 1999: 73–74). The common perception in India was that the Simla Agreement was a tacit acknowledgment of the Indian Union’s claim over the state. This perception in politically influential circles has seemed to give a much yearned after legitimacy to the centrist policies of both India and Pakistan.

(Nyla Ali Khan is a visiting professor at the University of Oklahoma. She earned her PhD in Post-colonial literature from OU. She is a member of the Scholars Strategy Network. She has written several books including The Fiction of Nationality in an Era of Transnationalism (Routledge, 2005), Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society, and Polity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), and The Life of a Kashmiri Woman: Dialectic of Resistance and Accommodation. Dr. Khan lives in Edmond with her husband Dr. Khan a practicing Rheumatologist and their daughter.)

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