The waning of American hegemony

by FLYNT LEVERETT and HILLARY MANN LEVERETT

File:Middle East (orthographic projection).svg Map of Middle East SOURCE/Wikipedia

Once carried out, the Obama administration’s thoroughly telegraphed strike on Syria, ostensibly over alleged chemical weapons use there, will mark an important inflection point in the terminal decline of America’s West Asia empire. Most importantly, it will confirm that America’s political class, including President Barack Obama himself, remains unwilling to face the political risks posed by any fundamental revision of Washington’s over-20-year, deeply self-damaging drive to dominate the region.

Mr. Obama initially ran for President pledging to end the “mindset” behind the strategic blunder of America’s 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq; in his first term, he committed to ending America’s war in Afghanistan, too, and to “rebalancing” toward Asia. But Mr. Obama was never ready to spend the political capital required for thoroughgoing recasting of U.S. foreign policy; consequently, the dissipation of American power (hard and soft) evident under George W. Bush has accelerated.

Mr. Obama’s approach to Syria illustrates why. Since conflict started there two and a half years ago, Washington has had openings for a negotiated resolution. This, though, would entail power-sharing between Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and oppositionists and cooperation with Russia, Iran, and China to fix a settlement. Instead, Mr. Obama doubled down on reasserting American hegemony.

Desperate moves

When unrest began in Syria in March 2011, Mr. Obama and his team were desperate to show — after the loss of pro-Western regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and near-misses in Bahrain and Yemen — that the Arab Awakening did not just threaten authoritarian orders that subordinated their foreign policy to Washington. They wanted to show that leaders committed to foreign policy independence — like Mr. Assad — were vulnerable, too. They also calculated that Mr. Assad’s ouster would tilt the regional balance against Tehran, generating leverage to force Iran’s surrender of its right to an internationally safeguarded but indigenous nuclear fuel cycle.

Two years ago, Mr. Obama declared that Mr. Assad “must go,” eviscerating prospects for a political settlement. Mr. Obama further damaged diplomatic prospects with three U.N. Security Council resolutions effectively authorising coercive regime change in Damascus, which Russia and China vetoed. His Syria strategy rested on the surreal proposition that a staggeringly fractious “opposition,” much of which publicly aligns with al-Qaeda and is not supported by anything close to a majority of Syrians, would unseat Mr. Assad, who (according to polls and other evidence) enjoys support from at least half of Syrian society.

Mr. Obama compounded all this with an equally foolish declaration that chemical weapons use was a U.S. “red line” — giving those looking for U.S. intervention motive to gas innocent civilians. Now that such weapons have been used, Mr. Obama cannot entertain that oppositionists may be responsible, for this would undercut his Syria strategy. His administration has presented no evidence that Mr. Assad’s forces used chemical weapons in Ghouta; when it alleged chemical weapons use at Khan al-Assal in March, it also offered no evidence of government responsibility. By contrast, Russia publicly presented a detailed forensic analysis showing that neither the munitions used at Khan al-Assal nor the chemical agent in them had been industrially manufactured and that, “therefore, there is every reason to believe that it was the armed opposition fighters who used the chemical weapons.” Washington rejected this —and, after trying to derail a U.N. investigation of more recent allegations about Ghouta, has pre-emptively dismissed whatever U.N. inspectors there now may conclude.

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