by ANATOL LIEVEN
A history of the first Anglo-Afghan war describes the consequences of political ignorance and military folly – and the west’s failure to learn from past mistakes
Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, by William Dalrymple, Bloomsbury, RRP£25, 608 pages
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In his brilliant new book on the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-42, Return of a King, the British historian and travel writer William Dalrymple describes the tragic beginnings of the Great Game in Afghanistan, and how unnecessary it all was. The invasion to dethrone and replace the Afghan ruler Dost Mohammed Khan was prompted by fears of a Russian takeover of the country that were the merest paranoia. The Russians had no plans whatsoever at that time to invade India through Afghanistan; nor could they have done so, since their frontier was still hundreds of miles to the north, across the deserts of central Asia. The whole “threat” consisted of one semi-official emissary, Ivan Vitkevich (or rather Jan Witkiewicz, since he was Polish by birth), who was later disowned by the Russian government.
Financial Times for more
(Thanks to reader)