by SOLOMON A. DERSSO
Operating in the absence of a permanent constitution and with only nominal powers, Morsi faces the prospect of running a government that is doomed to fail. One possible way to avoid this is to defy the constitutional amendments taken during this eventful month and launch a power struggle within existing state institutions between the democratically elected office of the president and the military establishment. This is in addition to the on-going struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the army over the dissolution of Parliament.
If Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were to choose this course of action, there is no doubt that they will gain support from other political forces opposed to the power of the military establishment in the politics and economy of Egypt. However, this scenario will not be an easy one as it would inevitably result in political instability.
Another possible course of action for Morsi is to strike a deal with the army in a way that will enable both to accommodate each other. The Muslim Brotherhood is known for its pragmatism. This has earned it the reputation of being opportunist or intihaziya. Even during the transitional period this group’s tendency towards opportunism has been on display. For most of the transition period, the Muslim Brotherhood sided with the SCAF during the power struggle between revolutionary forces and the army. This tendency to accommodate the military leadership is visible in the victory speech that Morsi delivered to Egyptians. In the speech, he expressed his profound affection for the military in saying he regarded it with a ‘love in my heart that only God knows’. He promised to preserve the army.
Such accommodation with the army can be good for the stability of the country. However, it can also be detrimental for the revolution’s demand of achieving the democratic transformation of Egypt.
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