US intervention in Afghanistan: Justifying the unjustifiable?

by LEONI CONNAH

Abstract

This article argues that the USA and its Western allies have misused ‘Just War’ narratives to legitimise an external intervention in Afghanistan and their use of force during the War on Terror. It explores the extent to which such external interventions, military strategies, narratives and justifications by the USA may have contributed to state failure in Afghanistan. As the legitimacy of earlier external interventions is called into question, while the road ahead for Afghanistan remains precarious, thinking about a new paradigm of post-war reconstruction becomes important for the country and its people in years to come.

Introduction

In 2001, the USA invaded Afghanistan in pursuit of the War on Terror with the support of NATO and over 40 countries. For almost two decades, the USA has legitimised its military operations as ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ (2001–14) and ‘Operation Freedom’s Sentinel’ from 2015 to the present. During these military endeavours, over 100,000 civilians (UN News, 2020) and over 60,000 security forces have been killed (Al Jazeera, 2019). This article focuses on the US military interventions in Afghanistan since 2001, conducted by or on behalf of the USA. Apart from questioning to what extent such military operations are in line with international law, it examines their detrimental impacts on the stability of Afghanistan and directs attention towards the new paradigm of post-war reconstruction.Although the history of Afghanistan prior to 2001, and earlier US involvement, are important within the wider context (Khalilzad & Byman, 2000), this article assesses specifically the impact of US interventions on Afghanistan. Since 2001, the concept of ‘Just War’ has been used as a theoretical framework to scrutinise to what extent such external intervention in Afghanistan has adhered to recognised international principles or has acted as a smokescreen for military misadventure (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). Key components of just war theory, such as the right to go to war (jus ad bellum) and the right conduct during the war (jus in bello) are put under scrutiny. It is not the purpose of this article to compare US intervention in Afghanistan with other interventions such as the war in Iraq. Both are instances of large-scale warfare in the wake of 9/11 (Jacobson, 2010). The Iraq war is a separate case study and as it drew to a close, violence in Afghanistan increased and casualties rocketed (Jacobson, 2010: 587). Afghanistan is now the longest conflict in US history and deserves serious attention. Understanding the accomplishments and mistakes of the USA in the wider context of attempts to justify external intervention in Afghanistan is paramount also for the future security of the state and the region. With the changing nature of US engagement in Afghanistan under Trump’s leadership, the significance of this article also lies in considering the future of Western presence in Afghanistan.Methodologically, this article provides both quantitative and qualitative analysis of this intervention and its impacts. After this introduction, a brief consideration of Just War Theory in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ is followed by an analysis of the strategic objectives of US military intervention in Afghanistan, in light of international law principles. The necessity of intervention is then scrutinised, particularly in light of the serious problem of civilian deaths as collateral damage. The concluding analyses search for viable forms of post-conflict intervention.

Just War Theory and War on Terror

Just war doctrines originated in Catholic moral theology in the Middle Ages. As proposed by St Augustine of Hippo and St Thomas Aquinas, such doctrines were concerned with ‘holy warriors’ and ‘religious pacifists’ (Walzer, 2004: 4–20). In practice, just war theory has become deeply problematic, as it leaves much room for self-serving argumentations. The doctrine’s two main components relate to the decision or right to go to war (jus ad bellum) and conduct during the war (jus in bello), explained in the context of dispute resolution by Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 326). Considering the external intervention in Afghanistan to assess whether the US invasion adheres to just war criteria requires a brief examination of the right to go to war. Raines (2002: 224) explains the five main features of jus ad bellum: (a) there must be a just cause to go to war; (b) the decision ought to be made by a legitimate authority; (c) force is to be used only with the right intention and as a last resort; (d) there must be a reasonable hope for success, with peace as the expected outcome and (e) the use of force must be proportionate and discriminate.There is now a prominent third component, relating to post-conflict scenarios, jus post bellum, considering the termination of war and aspects of its consequences (Ledwidge, 2013). Just war theorising raises many philosophical, legal and political questions, one of them being why it is important for a war to be just. War inevitably involves the use of force, and a large number of people are likely to get killed (Walzer, 2006: 22). Therefore, intellectual efforts to understand legitimate uses of force in morally worthy pursuits are urgent, to understand if deadly force can be used with the right intent and in ways that are morally acceptable in the eyes of the international community (Patterson, 2012: 119).

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