By Nivedita Menon
This article critiques the Maoist strategy of systematic armed struggle against the state with the aim of replacing it with a socialist state. The Maoists do not expand the democratic space available for mass movements but rather mirror the repressive structures of the very state they are fighting. Genuine resistance to exploitation and oppression has come from radical mass movements which have built diverse coalitions on the ground and which have experimented with alternatives to the state. Anarchist is not an abuse which can be hurled at the Maoists, rather it is a resource for people fighting power structures.
There is over a century of discussion on political violence within the Marxist tradition and outside, but that is not my focus here. I also set aside arguments that condemn all violence as morally unacceptable, except to note that these do not always address the fact that the modern state has monopoly over legitimate means of coercion, thus establishing a visible horizon of violence within which we live.In this article, I will quickly outline my own views on violence in order to reflect on the possibilities for democratic politics today.
At the most obvious level, violence is associated with physical coercion and injury. Even here I distinguish between violence to person and to property, and within this, between violence to private property and to state-owned property, placing on a descending scale of magnitude, physical violence against the person, to private property and to state property. Structures of capitalist property, patriarchy or caste ensure that physical violence is not required to maintain inequality and injustice on a daily basis, because they successfully hegemonise public notions of morality. Thus, the violence carried out on the sense of self and on the bodies of the powerless in these structures and through these discourses, is invisible, while acts of resistance or counter-formations appear to be violent because they threaten the stability of the social order. Foucault might say that the very production of subjectivity through various discourses and practices of governmentality renders actual violence unnecessary unless faced with counter-formations of self – the feminist within patriarchy, the non-heterosexual within heteronormativity, the indisciplined body within capitalist work practices and the militant dalit within caste practices.
Such an understanding of structural violence underlies Ambedkar’s support in 1951, to the amendment to Article 19 limiting the right to freedom of expression. In this debate over the first amendment to the Constitution, Ambedkar argued that calls for social boycott of scheduled castes by caste Hindus, or campaigns to prevent them from using wells, constituted “incitement to violence”, and should not be protected under freedom of speech and expression.
An understanding of structural arrangements that leave some sections permanently empowered, and others permanently weak, would recognise that violent acts by the latter are unavoidable, and therefore tries to outline the kinds of violence that are morally justified, “self-defence” being the simplest of these. It is within this framework that the term “political violence” arises, as distinguished from criminal acts of violence. However, this distinction is impossible to sustain, beyond a point, for example theft by a person employed as a domestic servant, who may injure someone in the process. It cannot be understood simply as “criminal” if you place it within the violence involved in the very institution of “domestic servants”, rooted in feudal relations of power and patriarchal sexual division of labour. Nevertheless, “political violence” continues to be a useful conceptual device to differentiate an act of violence arising from a structure of violence that pre-exists and frames the act. A parallel distinction is often made that accepts the greater morality of violence of the weak against the strong.
Structural Violence of Property Relations
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