by JOHN P. RUEHL
A major investment project has left Albania caught between diverging US and European interests. The increasingly autonomous protest networks that the West spent decades building in the Balkans are further complicating matters.
After Miami-based firm Affinity Partners secured their first building permit for major developments on Albania’s coast on April 29, outrage in the small Balkan country has steadily grown.
Within weeks, a video of a protestor being beaten and dragged away by private security guards went viral, helping ignite what has become known as Albania’s “Flamingo Revolution.” On July 4, tens of thousands of Albanians marched in the capital, Tirana, with other demonstrations taking place across the country.
The movement is driven by two planned projects: a $1.7 billion luxury resort on Sazan Island and a $4.6 billion development around the Zvërnec Peninsula and Vjosë-Nartë wetlands. Similar developments have triggered protests elsewhere in the Balkans in recent years, often tapping into wider economic and corruption concerns.
The Flamingo Revolution has no single organizer. It draws from a loose network of environmental groups, anti-corruption activists, and ordinary citizens, many connected to civic organizations that Western governments helped build over three decades— but now operate independently of their original sponsors.
The primary financiers of the two projects have especially made these demonstrations notable. Both are being led by Affinity Partners, headed by Jared Kushner, son-in-law of US President Donald Trump and his informal adviser. Since its founding in 2021, the firm has been backed largely by sovereign wealth from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar.
Gulf states have increasingly been investing in large tourism projects over the last several years to diversify beyond hydrocarbons. But sovereign wealth investments are “more frequently also used to extend political reach,” states political economist Karen E. Young. Designed to cement relationships with foreign governments and business elites, Affinity Partners now acts as an informal bridge between Middle Eastern capitals and the White House.
For investors, Albania’s path toward EU membership would dramatically increase the value of planned tourism and other infrastructure developments. Sazan is, meanwhile, located in a strategically important position at the entrance to the Adriatic Sea, and new ports, marinas, and other developments could have dual-use applications for security purposes in a crucial area.
But as relations between Brussels and Washington have deteriorated during Trump’s second term, Albania’s EU ambitions have made the projects increasingly sensitive. On June 17, the European Parliament condemned the 2024 amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas, which cleared the way for the development of these projects, and asked that they be withdrawn. It also called for construction to be suspended in protected areas and compliance with EU nature protection standards. Several EU parliament members also warned that Albania’s accession could be jeopardized if the projects proceed.
The EU has strong reasons to defend its standards in a candidate country. Failing to do so would weaken its credibility and encourage future projects by foreign powers approved through questionable means. Yet Brussels has stopped short of joining calls by many protestors for Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama to resign. Many demonstrators also reject the mainstream opposition, suggesting political instability could remain regardless of who governs the country, complicating the EU’s wider expansion plans in the Balkans.
Albania’s EU ambitions now conflict with expanding American commercial and security interests, as well as investment from Gulf states. As divisions have grown in the Western alliance, countries that previously sat comfortably in its orbit have become areas of competition and instability.
The Serbian Precedent
Albania’s protests have also highlighted the growing autonomy of the transnational civil society network that the West spent more than three decades building in the Balkans. NGOs, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and agencies like USAID helped strengthen local institutions, watchdogs, and media networks to encourage integration with NATO and the EU. When institution-building failed, Western support also extended to protest movements to promote leadership change.
Serbia, another EU candidate, became the first proving ground for the “color revolution” model—widespread public protests seeking revolutionary political change—despite the term becoming more closely associated with former Soviet states. During the 2000 overthrow of Yugoslav President Slobodan Miloševi?, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives explained how it sought to “fund programs and media outlets that could disseminate messages pushing immediate political change.”
After Miloševi? was toppled, the number of Western NGOs in Serbia rose dramatically in the 2000s, building local civic capacity. A 2015 article in the Law Explorer, however, pointed out how contrary to the beliefs that these nonprofits were “a major progressive force countering the crude nationalism of the general public and leading Serbia on the road to eventual European Union membership. … much of the sector has in fact played a compromised, coopted, and at times destructive role in preparing the ground for and reinforcing neoliberal restructuring.”
Although relations with many Western governments deteriorated after Kosovo’s independence was recognized in 2008, the nonprofit networks remained. They resurfaced during anti-government protests in 2011 in Belgrade, and again in demonstrations against the UAE-backed Belgrade Waterfront redevelopment from 2015, foreshadowing Albania’s current movement. Protests against Serbian President Aleksandar Vu?i? have meanwhile erupted repeatedly since 2017.
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