by MOHAMAD HASAN SWEIDAN
Across the region, deals move quietly even as wars widen, binding normalization to a system that thrives on conflict.
Israel’s war is no longer confined to a single front or geography. Since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, Tel Aviv’s military operations have stretched across Gaza, the occupied West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran, forming a continuous theater of conflict rather than a series of isolated campaigns.
The scale matters not only for its human cost, but for what it reveals about how war is being used.
Across these fronts, Israel has deployed a wide range of military systems, from precision missiles and drones to interception platforms, radars, and electronic warfare tools. The battlefield now serves as a proving ground, where these systems are not only used but also showcased.
The central question, then, is no longer simply who arms Israel. It is who enables the system that turns ongoing war into a sustained cycle of production, testing, and global sales.
For decades, US and western support formed the backbone of Israel’s military capacity, providing political cover, financial backing, and technological cooperation. That structure remains intact. But it is no longer the only pillar.
A second layer has taken shape over recent years: normalized Arab states, particularly those tied to the Abraham Accords. These states have become a growing market for Israeli defense exports, forming part of a financial circuit that feeds directly into the industries underpinning Israel’s wars.
The numbers behind the industry
Data released by Israel’s Ministry of Defense shows that defense exports reached a record $19.2 billion in 2025, marking the fifth consecutive year of growth. Over five years, exports have doubled; over a decade, they have quadrupled.
Roughly half of these deals, about $10 billion, are direct government-to-government agreements. That detail is critical. It points to a system where arms exports are not merely commercial transactions, but embedded in political and security relationships.
The trajectory of Arab participation in this market reflects the same pattern. In 2022, Abraham Accords countries accounted for 24 percent of Israeli defense exports, roughly $3 billion. In 2023, their share dropped sharply to around three percent, as the Gaza war reshaped public optics and political messaging.
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